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Articles
Constitutional Adventures in Wonderland:
Exploring the Debate Between Rules and
Standards Through the Looking Glass of
the First Amendment
by
DAVID L. FAIGMAN*
At this moment the King, who had been for some time busily
writing in his note-book, called out "Silence!" and read out from his
book "Rule Forty-two. All persons more than a mile high to leave the
court."
Everybody looked at Alice.
"im not a mile high," said Alice.
"Nearly two miles high," added the Queen.
"Well, I shan't go, at any rate," said Alice; "besides, that's not a
regular rule: you invented it just now."
"It's the oldest rule in the book," said the King.
"Then it ought to be Number One," said Alice.
The King turned pale, and shut his note-book hastily. "Consider
your verdict," he said to the jury, in a low trembling voice.
-Lewis Carroll'
Introduction
The first "rule" in the Bill of Rights "book" reads, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
... "2 The seemingly categorical nature of the speech and religion
clauses regularly sparks substantial debate about constitutional methods
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 92 (Bantam Classic ed.
1981) (1865).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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and, in particular, rules versus standards in constitutional adjudication.3
The rule-like reasoning of several recent First Amendment decisions
have helped to bring the issue to the forefront of the collective constitu-
tional consciousness. 4 The debate over rules and standards transcends
the First Amendment, however, reaching into every corner of the Consti-
tution. Still, the First Amendment provides a powerful looking glass
through which to explore the question whether constitutional rules are
"regular rules" or rather resemble the King's pronouncement ordering
"all persons more than a mile high to leave the court." But in the im-
mortal words of Alice, the deeper one searches in this constitutional
wonderland, the "curiouser and curiouser" s the adventure becomes.
On the Supreme Court, the rules-standards debate is most ardently
joined by Justice Scalia, who strongly favors a rules based jurisprudence, 6
and Justice O'Connor, who prefers a standards based approach. In the
background of this debate stands a profound query: Does constitutional
method affect constitutional substance? Professor Kathleen Sullivan re-
cently answered this query in the negative, and provided numerous ex-
amples indicating that the decision to choose either rules or standards
does not, directly, lead to specific outcomes.7 As she demonstrated, lib-
eral and conservative justices alike use both methods to great advantage.
Yet, the amount of ink spilled over debating the virtues of rules ver-
sus standards would lead the reasonable observer to believe that some-
thing momentous was at stake. As the debate now stands, it does not
seem to matter very much what method the Court chooses. Instead, sub-
stantive value choices alone provide the only fertile ground for discus-
sion; destination is what is important, not the route chosen to get there.
We are at a similar crossroads to the one Alice faced when she met the
Cheshire Cat:
"Cheshire-Puss," she began, rather timidly. . . . "Would you tell
me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"
3. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981) [hereinafter Schauer, Categories]; Pierre J. Schlag, An
Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REv. 671 (1983).
4. See, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 24 (1992).
5. CARROLL, supra note 1, at 8.
6. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989). Many other scholars share the responsibility for fanning the flames of the rules-stan-
dards debate. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHI-
CAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1992);
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987);
Schauer, Categories, supra note 3.
7. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 122-23.
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"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the
Cat.
"I don't much care where--" said Alice.
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said the Cat.
"-so long as I get somewhere," Alice added as an explanation.
"Oh, you're sure to do that," said the Cat, "if you only walk long
enough."
Alice felt that this could not be denied, so she tried another ques-
tion. "What sort of people live about here?"
"In that direction," the Cat said, waving its right paw round,
"lives a Hatter: and in that direction," waving the other paw, "lives a
March Hare. Visit either you like: they're both mad."
Just as for Alice, the Court's choice of direction, rules or standards,
affects its eventual destination very little; with either choice, the Court
will get somewhere, if it only walks long enough. The seeming ambiva-
lence about direction, however, masks important aspects of the adven-
ture. Although the choice between rules and standards might not
directly affect particular outcomes, it profoundly affects how the story is
told. Thus, the Court's choice of method might influence subsequent de-
cisions by affecting how what was done is explained. Moreover, the
seeming choice between rules and standards is more complicated than it
might first appear. Like the Cheshire Cat, the truly important principles
inherent in this debate are prone to disappearing with little notice. This
Article offers a preliminary exploration of the distinction between rules
and standards in the constitutional context, with a view to making some
sense of the Court's constitutional adventures. And, no doubt, as with
Alice's adventures, future chapters will be necessary.
I. Beyond Rules and Standards-Definition and Adjudication
Inherent in the debate between rules and standards lies an important
irony. The debate assumes a categorical distinction between rules and
standards that does not exist. This assumption is incorrect in two re-
spects. At a superficial level, the choice is not categorical, for constitu-
tional methods lie along a spectrum,8 ranging from category definition at
one pole to ad hoc balancing on the other.9 At a deeper level, the rules-
standards debate mischaracterizes the dynamic inherent in constitutional
adjudication. It places the constitutional method along a single dimen-
8. Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 650
(1991).
9. See David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests:
Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1535 (1992) [here-
inafter Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests].
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sion when it actually operates along two dimensions. This collapsing of
constitutional space distorts the Court's perception of the process.
The two dimensions of constitutional adjudication are definition and
application.1l At the definition stage, the object is to identify the liberty
concern implicated by the challenged government action, that is to say,
what the Constitution means. This involves a search of such standard
authorities as the text, original intent, precedent, constitutional scholar-
ship and so on.11 Once the liberty right has been defined, the Court must
then assess that right against the strength of the government interests.
This assessment occurs at the application stage, during which the Court
determines whether the government interests justify the infringement of
liberty. This two-dimensional process takes its form from the basic
structure of American constitutional democracy. 12
Constitutional choices, however close and difficult, can be described
simply. The essential decision involves a choice between the power of the
majority to rule as it desires and the liberty of the individual to be free of
majority power. This determination has been labelled the Madisonian
dilemma. 13 Specifically, the Court is empowered in our system to medi-
ate between two tyrannies. The tyranny of the majority occurs when the
majority rules in areas of protected liberty; and the tyranny of the minor-
ity occurs when the majority is prevented from ruling in areas that are
not protected. It is the Court's task to monitor the boundary between
these two tyrannies.
If the Bill of Rights is to be an effective bulwark against majority
tyranny, it cannot be defined by the government's purposes for acting.
Liberty must be defined independently of the government's reasons for
infringing that liberty. As Professor Robert A. Dahl explained, to allow
the majority to decide "whether the punishing of some specified act
would or would not be tyrannical... is precisely what Madison meant to
prevent, and moreover would make the concept of majority tyranny
meaningless .... ,,14 Thus, at the definition stage of constitutional analy-
sis, the government's reasons for its action should not enter into the
10. Id. at 1530-39.
11. See generally Richard Fallon, A Constitutional Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1189 (1987).
12. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests, supra note 9, at
1529.
13. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 3 (1971); see also ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 22-24
(1956) (discussing the operational meaning of "tyranny" in reconciling the dilemma).
14. DAHL, supra note 13, at 24.
[Vol. 44
equation. Only subsequent to this definition of rights is the majority's
interest in acting reconciled with the individual's liberty.
In constitutional adjudication, therefore, two types of rules are pos-
sible: rules at the definition stage and rules at the application stage.
However unlikely, the Bill of Rights might mark out some absolute cate-
gories within which the government may not act. For instance, a literal
reading of the Free Speech Clause would indicate that "no law" means
no law.15 As numerous justices and constitutional theorists have con-
cluded, however, such an interpretation is unworkable. 16 Most of the
time, if not always, constitutional rules take shape at the application
stage.17 Rule construction in constitutional adjudication, therefore, usu-
ally occupies the final step of constitutional adjudication, not the first. 18
The Court's failure to recognize the nature of "rule" development in
constitutional adjudication leads to systematic distortions in its jurispru-
dence. First, many constitutional results described as categorical are in-
distinguishable from a standards-based method. In addition, failure to
appreciate the source of constitutional rules effectively shifts the burden
of proof to the challenger of the government action to disprove the basis
for the government interests used to define the rule. 19 And, finally,
promulgating rules at the definition stage undermines the full and fair
debate of constitutional values-a debate that is necessary to a well func-
tioning constitutional democracy. The next Section examines these three
distorting effects.
15. Justice Black was the most famous adherent of this categorical view. See HUGO L.
BLACK, A CONsTrrrrIONAL FArrH 45 (1968) ("I simply believe that 'Congress shall make no
law' means Congress shall make no law."); see also Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr.
Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REV. 428, 441-44 (1967).
16. See, ag., MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.03 (1984).
17. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 90 (1989) ("Because no constitutional rights are absolute,
virtually every constitutional case involves the question whether the government's action is
justified by a sufficient purpose.").
18. Most constitutional rules are not "regular rules," like the 55 mile/hour speed limit or
a two-year statute of limitations period. Instead, they reflect a complex combination of values
whose respective origins matter a great deal. They are not simply pronounced by the text; they
take shape out of the clash between the liberty described by the text and the legitimate will of
the majority that must be measured independently of the text.
19. See Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests, supra note 9,
at 1523-25, 1544-47.
April 1993] RULES AND STANDARDS
A. Standards That Masquerade as Rules
Many have attempted to construe the Free Speech Clause in cate-
gorical terms.20 A claimed success might be obscenity. 2 1 Simply stated,
the First Amendment does not protect obscene publications. This seems
to be a simple enough rule. But what fits into the rule are those materials
that "(a) . . . 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find . . . , taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest .... ; (b) ... depictfl or describe[], in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)...
taken as a whole, lack[] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."' 22  But this "rule" looks like, sounds like, and acts like a
"standard."
In fact, the "rule" of obscenity nearly represents a paradigmatic il-
lustration of standards in constitutional adjudication. The only detail
that distinguishes the obscenity rule from ad hoc balancing-the most
extreme sort of standards-based method-is the identity of the deci-
sionmaker.23 Whereas in the typical ad hoc balancing case the judge as-
sesses the relevant facts and values, in obscenity cases the jury does so.
The three criteria that "define" obscenity, and especially the first and the
third, call upon the jury to weigh the merits of the material. For in-
stance, determining "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value," is not the sort of factual finding inherent in regular rule applica-
tion. Application of the Miller test requires a refined sense of the values
and standards inherent in the First Amendment. Implicit in rules-based
application is a straightforward factual determination. In many constitu-
20. See generally Schlag, supra note 3, at 706-30 (discussing and criticizing the "categori-
cal" theories of Meiklejohn, Emerson, and Baker).
21. See Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity' An Exer-
cise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979) [hereinafter
Schauer, Speech and "Speech'".
22. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229,
230 (1972) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957))).
23. It is instructive to compare the "categorical" Miller obscenity test to the ad hoc bal-
ancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the paradigmatic balancing decision.
See Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 948. The Mathews Court announced a three part balancing test
that would have courts, in each case, weigh (1) the individual right against (2) the "risk of an
erroneous deprivation" and the value of alternative procedures, together with, (3) the govern-
ment's interest both generally and in the specific administrative alternatives. Mathews, 424
U.S. at 335. Although the Miller test does not explicitly call for "weighing" the depth of the
individual right against the strength of the government's interests, such balancing is the inevi-
table result. Just as judges must under Mathews, juries must evaluate the value of the individ-
ual right against the basis for the government's interest in regulating when applying the Miller
test.
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tional contexts, ostensible factual judgments contain a substantial norma-
tive component. 24
A Constitution that had many regular rules at the definition stage is
dificult to imagine. The Court's task requires it to mediate between indi-
vidual rights and majority will. The Constitution identifies the boundary
between these opposing forces by articulating principles that might be
used to locate the boundary. This is not to say that rules are not impor-
tant to constitutional analysis; constitutional rules develop out of an ac-
commodation between constitutional values and government interests-
they are rarely found in the text alone.
B. Removing the Burden of Proof from the Government
The Court regularly imports into rights-definition consideration of
the government interests advanced to justify an infringement of a right.25
Although this practice occurs across the entire spectrum of constitu-
tional methods, it is endemic to rules-based methods. Because the Bill of
24. Another example is the recent decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992), in which the Court defined the "undue burden" test as a shorthand for a "state
regulation [that] has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Id. at 2820. This test, or rule, has a large
factual component but, as indicated by the word "substantial," also contains significant nor-
mative aspects. For instance, is the same obstacle similarly "substantial" in week 8 as in week
18?
25. See Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests, supra note 9.
Several commentators have noted the use of government interest analysis in rights definition.
Professors Laurence Tribe and Michael Doff, for instance, criticized Justice Scalia for relying
on government purposes in the process of defining the liberty right at stake in Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 n.4 (1989). They remarked on the effect of this approach:
When we automatically incorporate the factors that provide the state's possible justi-
fications for its regulation into the initial definition of a liberty, the fundamental na-
ture of that liberty nearly vanishes. Unless the state's interest is facially absurd,
when it is suitably incorporated into an asserted liberty it will render that liberty so
specific as to seem insupportable.... At a minimum, the privacy right protected in
Roe becomes the implausible "right" to destroy a living fetus. If one takes footnote 4
to its logical limit in the interpretation of enumerated rights, then the free speech
right protected in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan becomes the dubious "right" to
libel a public official, and the right to an exclusionary remedy protected in Mapp v.
Ohio becomes the counter-intuitive "right" of a criminal to suppress the truth. To
state these cases this way is to decide them in the government's favor .... Under
Justice Scalia's footnote 4 approach.., the state interest obliterates, without expla-
nation and at the outset, any trace of the individual liberty at stake.
Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1057, 1096-97 (1990) (footnotes omitted). See also Henry P. Monaghan, Of
"Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 429 (1977) (noting the Court's use of
government purposes to limit the definitional scope of the Due Process Clause); JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDIcIAL REVIEW 69 (1980) (noting the
Court's use of government purposes to define "cruel and unusual" in the Eighth Amendment).
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Rights contains few, if any, absolute rules, constitutional rules are a func-
tion of a delicate weighing and balancing of standards. By ignoring this
aspect of constitutional construction, the Court turns the constitutional
order on its head. 26
For example, in Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith, 27 Justice Scalia ostensibly applied a rules-based categor-
ical approach to decide whether Oregon could constitutionally deny
unemployment benefits to a Native American dismissed from his job for
the "religiously inspired" use of peyote. 28 Scalia concluded that the Free
Exercise Clause was not implicated. This categorical conclusion appears,
on its face, curious. In fact, his rules approach contains significant stan-
dard-like analysis. He explored the historical meaning of the clause to-
gether with both the strength of the government's overriding need to
uniformly regulate controlled substances29 and a grave concern over the
effects of subjecting all similar government regulations to the rigors of
the compelling interest standard. 30 Scalia folded the government's justifi-
cation for its action into the definition of the free exercise right.
It is instructive to compare Justice Scalia's rules path to the stan-
dards path Justice O'Connor followed to arrive at the same destination.
First, O'Connor found incredible the conclusion that good-faith religious
use of peyote did not even implicate the Free Exercise Clause. 31 In fact,
she concluded that the Free Exercise Clause was deeply implicated, thus
26. Once again, Lewis Carroll provides an apt literary allusion. One of Alice's better-
known adventures is her conversation with the Caterpillar who sits on a mushroom smoking a
hookah. Alice is quite disturbed at this point of the story by her tendency to change size often
and abruptly, leading her to question who she is. Adding to her consternation, she is having
difficulty remembering things:
"Can't remember what things?" said the Caterpillar.
"Well, I've tried to say 'How doth the little busy bee,' but it all came different!"
Alice replied in a very melancholy voice.
"Repeat 'You are old, Father William,'" said the Caterpillar.
Alice folded her hands, and began:
"You are old, Father William," the young man said
"And your hair has become very white,
And yet you incessantly stand on your head-
Do you think, at your age, it is right?"
"In my youth, " Father William replied to his son,
"I feared it might injure the brain;
But, now that I'm perfectly sure I have none,
Why, I do it again and again.
CARROLL, supra note 1, at 33.
27. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
28. Id. at 876.
29. Id. at 885.
30. Id. at 888-89.
31. Id. at 893-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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requiring the government to justify any infringement with compelling
reasons. 32 Nonetheless, she determined that the government met this
burden in light of its need to uniformly regulate controlled substances in
order to stem the tide of illegal drug use.33
Close scrutiny of the Scalia and O'Connor paths uncovers substan-
tial similarities between them. The choice between liberty and majority
will is made whether one applies a rule or a standard. As is abundantly
clear in Smith, Scalia was entangled in exactly the same value choices
that confronted O'Connor. Scalia, however, used standards to define
Smith outside of the free exercise box. In fact, Scalia used the same stan-
dards to define Smith outside of free exercise coverage that O'Connor
used to apply free exercise standards so as to exclude Smith from free
exercise protection.34
Although Scalia and O'Connor arrived at the same conclusion, the
divergent paths they chose have substantially affected constitutional dis-
course. By incorporating the government's purposes into the definition
of the right, Scalia effectively put the burden on the challenger of the
government action to refute the weight and necessity of the government's
reasons. Ordinarily, this burden is borne by the government. 35 When
32. Id at 901-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
33. Id at 905-06 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
34. The distinction between coverage and protection is an important one that is often
overlooked in constitutional law. Justice Frankfurter emphasized the distinction as follows:
To state that individual liberties may be affected is to establish the condition for,
not to arrive at the conclusion of, constitutional decision. Against the impediments
which particular governmental regulation causes to entire freedom of individual ac-
tion, there must be weighed the value to the public of the ends which the regulation
may achieve.
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 91 (1961); see
also Schauer, Speech and "Speech," supra note 21, at 905 ("It is especially important... to
distinguish between activities that are within the scope of the first amendment and those that
are not, and at the same time to distinguish between coverage and protection.").
35. Justice O'Connor explicitly noted that the government carried the burden of proof:
"Even if, as an empirical matter, a government's criminal laws might usually serve a compel-
ling interest in health, safety, or public order, the First Amendment at least requires a case-by-
case determination of the question, sensitive to the facts of each particular claim." Smith, 494
U.S. at 899. In another recent First Amendment decision, Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846
(1992), the Court upheld Tennessee's prohibition on campaign activity within 100 feet of an
entrance to a polling place. Justice Stevens' dissent, however, criticized the plurality for
"blithely dispens[ing] with the need for factual findings" under the strict scrutiny standard.
Id. at 1863 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Ironically, Justice O'Connor joined Justice Stevens' dis-
sent despite the fact that it applies just as well to her concurrence in Smith. Justice Stevens
observed:
[A]lthough the plurality recognizes the problematic character of Tennessee's content-
based suppressive regulation it nonetheless upholds the statute because "there is sim-
ply no evidence" that commercial or charitable solicitation outside the polling place
poses the same potential dangers as campaigning outside the polling place. This
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government interests are used to define the right at stake, inevitably the
will of the majority prevails.36 It prevails not because it has greater
weight, but because it infects and disables liberty from within, and with-
out notice.
To be sure, O'Connor's analysis might also be criticized, but on a
somewhat different basis. O'Connor applied the traditional standard that
the government had to demonstrate a compelling interest. In believing
that this standard was met, she cannot be criticized for failing to assess
the weight or necessity of the government interests, only for misassessing
them.37
Scalia need not abandon rules or categories in his constitutional
method. But because rules are a function of the clash between
majoritarian values and individual liberty, the Court must assume the
responsibility for making the difficult choices along the constitutional
frontier. Inevitably, therefore, when the Constitution is implicated, the
Court must weigh the social importance of the government action against
the value of individual liberty infringed by that action. This balance
might very well result in a rule to be applied in future cases. These cate-
gories do not precede, but rather follow, a balancing of the rights and
interests in conflict.
The law of libel is an instructive example. In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,38 the Court fashioned the actual malice test 39 and applied it to
analysis contradicts a core premise of strict scrutiny-namely, that the heavy burden
of justification is on the State. The plurality has effectively shifted the burden of
proving the necessity of content discrimination from the State to the plaintiff.
Id. at 1866 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Constitutional factfinding, in general,
has not been an area of distinction for the Court. See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitu-
tional Factfinding" Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 541, 564 (1991) ("Constitutional facts [are] only roughly based on empirical
reality; they existf in a nether world, somewhere within the Constitution itself.").
36. The following passage captures Scalia's majoritarian perspective:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at
a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but
that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a sys-
tem in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
37. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Deci-
sion, 57 U. CM. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1990) (noting that the result of the compelling interest
test in Smith is "a close question").
38. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
39. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, explained the constitutional requirement as
follows: "The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'...." Id. at 279-80.
[Vol. 44
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state libel laws intended to protect public officials from defamation. One
would search in vain to find this test in the First Amendment. It was
molded out of a close examination of the balance of rights and interests
inherent in the First Amendment. It is not helpful to "define" the First
Amendment as covering "speech" but not covering "libelous speech
written with actual malice." Libelous speech is "speech." When di-
rected at a public official, libelous speech is proscribable only when writ-
ten with actual malice; written falsehoods short of this scienter
requirement are protected because of the principles behind "free speech."
After weighing these standards against the competing government inter-
ests, the Court fashioned a rule to guide courts in future cases.
As noted above, every constitutional method can be applied to any
result. But this does not mean that all constitutional methods are legiti-
mate. Failure to appreciate the two dimensions of constitutional space,
definition and application, undermines the theoretical and structural
foundation of American constitutional democracy. When constitutional
space is collapsed, the majority's responsibility for justifying infringe-
ments of liberty is lost through the process of using these very interests to
define liberty; in effect, the individual is saddled with the burden that the
majority properly should carry. Moreover, insufficient attention is given
to the clash between rights and interests, a result that ripples through
subsequent cases. Constitutional discourse is muffled through the tactic
of avoiding difficult choices by concluding that "no right" exists. The
final section briefly considers the importance of an open discussion of
constitutional standards.
C. The Court's Responsibility to Tell the Constitutional Story
The decision to follow a rules or standards path, while not affecting
destination, deeply affects how the story is told. The standards path
leads to a more complex and satisfying story. Rules-based analysis tends
to leave value choices implicit; values invariably are folded into the pro-
cess of category definition. In contrast, the principles and policies of con-
stitutional analysis are necessarily made explicit in a standards-based
jurisprudence.
The importance of explicit statements of value in constitutional
decisionmaking lies in the Court's role in American democracy. The
Court is, and must be, an active participant in the deliberative process of
a democracy. In a successful constitutional democracy, the three
branches of the federal government, the states and the people are all
joined in a continuing dialogue over constitutional values. Obviously, it
matters what substantive results the Court reaches in particular cases.
April 1993]
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Much more important, however, is the manner in which they reach these
results. To the extent the Court's methodology invites the political com-
munity into the discussion, and promotes that deliberation that marks a
great democracy, it plays a central role in our constitutional system-
indeed, a pivotal role.
Over the last thirty years, most constitutional scholarship has been
preoccupied with concern over the "counter-majoritarian" difficulty. 4°
The Court's role is "difficult" because judicial review permits unelected
judges to substitute their views of the Constitution's provisions for those
of popularly elected representatives. 41 Professor John Hart Ely summa-
rized the difficulty concisely: "[A] body that is not elected or otherwise
politically responsible in any significant way is telling the people's elected
representatives that they cannot govern as they'd like."'42 The counter-
majoritarian difficulty renders suspicious too close judicial scrutiny of
majoritarian action or too much solicitude of individual rights.
Although scholars increasingly question the majoritarian perspective, 43
it remains the ascendant paradigm. 44
The majoritarian perspective, together with the guilt induced by the
counter-majoritarian difficulty, have inclined the Court to prefer a rules-
based method of constitutional adjudication. Rules have long been asso-
ciated with a restrained judicial role in the governing process. However,
in light of the fact that rules and standards lead to the same destinations
(i.e., any destination), we should reevaluate blind obedience to the rules
tradition. Indeed, if constitutional rules are actually a function of a rec-
onciliation of the conflicting standards of individual rights and govern-
40. The term comes from ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
16 (2d ed. 1986); on scholars' preoccupation with the difficulty, see Laurence E. Wiseman, The
New Supreme Court Commentators: The Principled, the Political, and the Philosophical, 10
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 315, 355-69 (1983) (observing that the greatest challenge for many
modem constitutional commentators is to justify the rights and entitlements they would have
the Court read into the Constitution).
41. See BICKEL, supra note 40, at 34-37.
42. ELY, supra note 25, at 4-5.
43. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 61 (criticizing the Rehnquist Court's defer-
ence to the majoritarian values of the elected branches); Stephen M. Griffin, What is Constitu-
tional Theory? The Newer Theory and the Decline of the Learned Tradition, 62 S. CAL. L.
REV. 493, 506-14 (1989) (arguing that the realist theory of democracy, which assumes the
primacy of majoritarian decisionmaking, is simplistic and should be reconsidered); Lawrence
G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893 (1990) (arguing that the para-
digm of "popular sovereignty" cannot be reconciled with our constitutional tradition, and that
we should abandon that effort and recognize the promise of the tradition we have built).
44. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 61; supra note 36 (quote indicating Justice
Scalia's strong majoritarian perspective in Smith).
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ment interests, we must inquire into the consequences of the Court's
failure to conduct an explicit weighing of constitutional principles.
Although all government officials take an oath to defend the Consti-
tution, the Court assumes the role of final line of defense. It is peculiarly
the Court's task to say what the Constitution means. Yet, "we the peo-
ple" and our representatives have not abandoned our constitutional re-
sponsibility. We the people have always stood ready to challenge and, if
necessary, check the Court. In order for the dynamic of this process, this
dialogue, to function effectively, we the people must understand what the
Court is doing. The Court, therefore, must tell a complete and believable
constitutional story.
When the Court explicitly applies standards in reaching particular
constitutional results, it tells a better, more faithful story to the nation.
In the end, constitutional values do not belong exclusively to the Court.
The Court is merely a player, albeit a pivotal one, in the American
drama. The Court's lines, therefore, are essential to the other actors'
participation. By stating explicitly the constitutional standards responsi-
ble for its conclusions, the Court invites the other actors into the consti-
tutional scene. The hallmark of a well-functioning constitutional
democracy is full, open and informed discussion of matters affecting the
Republic. The Court's explanation of the principles inherent in the Con-
stitution, and the competing interests of the majority in support of its
action, strengthens the democratic foundation of the nation.
Conclusion
The striking aspect of Lewis Carroll's Alice's Adventures in Wonder-
land is the contingent and chaotic nature of the events, people, language,
and logic of Wonderland. Sometimes, the Court's constitutional adven-
tures share these qualities.
The constitutional story is sometimes told as a straightforward para-
ble of rules and sometimes as a complex tale of standards. Yet, which-
ever method the Court chooses, any outcome can be reached.
Constitutional method, it seems, does not affect constitutional result.
This freedom over outcome, however, masks the importance inherent in
the manner in which the Court tells the story.
In several important ways the choice of constitutional method has
concrete and profound ramifications for the development of constitu-
tional values. First, many "rules" are really standards in disguise. Fail-
ure to recognize the enormous normative content in case-by-case
application of constitutional "rules" inevitably distorts constitutional de-
bate. Moreover, reconciling government interests and individual liberty
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in a rule-like fashion often obscures the basis for the result. In particular,
the practical effect of constitutionally defined rules is to put the burden of
proof on the challenger of government action to disprove the govern-
ment's justification for infringing liberty-a burden traditionally placed
on the government. Finally, the Court's failure to clearly articulate its
value choices undermines the foundation of American constitutional de-
mocracy. At the core of the American constitutional system is the peo-
ple's participation in government. An essential aspect of American
government is the Constitution and the values it embraces. The more
complete the story the Court tells, the better prepared are "we the peo-
ple" to "form a more perfect union."
